CVE-2025-13526: 7 Essential Lessons from the OneClick Chat to Order IDOR

Why we’re finally writing about CVE-2025-13526

By now, CVE-2025-13526 has been widely covered by vulnerability databases and third-party blogs.

Most of those posts describe the OneClick Chat to Order vulnerability from the outside: CVSS, affected versions, and a short mitigation note. What’s missing is the view from the team that actually found it.

This article is our side of the story—from initial discovery to coordinated disclosure—plus practical guidance for:

• WordPress site owners running OneClick Chat to Order
• Plugin and theme developers who want to avoid similar WordPress IDOR vulnerabilities
• Security teams are building repeatable checks and evidence around CVE-style issues

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What is CVE-2025-13526?

CVE-2025-13526 is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the OneClick Chat to Order WordPress plugin.

According to NVD and Wordfence, all versions up to and including 1.0.8 are affected via the wa_order_thank_you_override function, which fails to validate a user-controlled key before loading an order.

In plain language:

• The plugin uses an order identifier from the URL on the thank-you page.
• It doesn’t properly check whether the current visitor is allowed to see that order.
• By changing the order_id in the URL, an attacker can view other customers’ order details without authentication.

Public advisories agree that exposed data can include:

• Customer names and email addresses
• Phone numbers
• Billing and shipping addresses
• Order contents and prices
• Payment method information shown on the confirmation page

CVE-2025-13526 carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (High) with network-accessible, low-complexity exploitation requiring no privileges and no user interaction, primarily impacting confidentiality.

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How we discovered the OneClick Chat to Order vulnerability

During a penetration test for a production WooCommerce deployment, we were asked to review the full purchase flow that used OneClick Chat to Order to turn WhatsApp messages into orders.

We followed a typical user journey:

1. Add items to cart.
2. Confirm via chat.
3. Land on a thank-you URL similar to: https://example.com/checkout/thank-you/?order_id=123456

Three red flags appeared immediately for anyone who has hunted WordPress IDOR vulnerabilities before:

• order_id was numeric and sequential.
• No unguessable token or hash accompanied order_id.
• The page displayed even when the browser session looked unauthenticated from a WordPress perspective.

With a single legitimate order URL, we performed a carefully controlled test:

• Kept the same client, IP, and cookies.
• Changed only order_id (for example, from 123456 to 123455).
• Observed whether the response changed.

Instead of an error, the server rendered another customer’s order—confirming an IDOR / BOLA vulnerability that later became CVE-2025-13526.

We validated a very small number of additional IDs to confirm consistency while minimizing exposure to live data, then stopped and moved directly to reporting.

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Technical root cause: missing object-level authorization

At its core, CVE-2025-13526 is a Broken Object Level Authorization bug in the wa_order_thank_you_override logic.

Conceptually, the vulnerable pattern looked like this:

// Vulnerable pattern (simplified pseudocode)

function wa_order_thank_you_override() {
    $order_id = $_GET['order_id'];        // user-controlled
    $order    = get_order_by_id($order_id);

    if (!$order) {
        return show_404();
    }

    // ❌ No check that current visitor owns this order
    render_thank_you_page($order);
}

The fix is all about object ownership:

// Safer pattern (simplified pseudocode)

function wa_order_thank_you_override() {
    $order_id = $_GET['order_id'];
    $order    = get_order_by_id($order_id);

    if (!$order) {
        return show_404();
    }

    $current_user_id = get_current_user_id();

    if (!user_can_view_order($current_user_id, $order)) {
        // Optional: log suspicious access attempt
        return show_404(); // or 403
    }

    render_thank_you_page($order);
}

To prevent another OneClick Chat to Order vulnerability of this type:

• Treat every ID (order, invoice, ticket, message) as sensitive.
• Always tie it to an authorization decision that knows who the caller is.
• Centralize this logic so every path—UI, REST, AJAX, shortcodes—shares the same enforcement.

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Impact: why CVE-2025-13526 is more than “just info disclosure”

CVE-2025-13526 is categorised under CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor).

The business impact is serious:

• Privacy risk: Attackers can pull complete order profiles for customers who never interacted with them.
• Fraud enablement: Order and address histories make phishing and social engineering significantly more convincing.
• Compliance pain: For stores under GDPR or similar regimes, uncontrolled leaks of names, emails, and addresses can trigger notification and reporting obligations.
• Scraping at scale: Because exploitation is unauthenticated and IDs are predictable, even a basic script can iterate through thousands of orders.

This is why WordPress order data exposure issues like CVE-2025-13526 deserve the same urgency you reserve for injection bugs.

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Vendor response and patch

Tracking data from multiple public sources shows that:

• All OneClick Chat to Order versions ≤ 1.0.8 ship with this IDOR vulnerability.
• Version 1.0.9 introduces additional validation to the wa_order_thank_you_override function, closing CVE-2025-13526.
• The fix is recorded in a WordPress plugin repository changeset and referenced in Wordfence’s advisory.

Our role:

1. We privately reported the issue with a clear PoC, list of affected flows, and suggested mitigations.
2. The vendor acknowledged quickly and prioritized a fix.
3. We helped validate the patch and regression tests before and after release.
4. In their 1.0.9 security note, the vendor credited Md Shofiur R. from Pentest Testing Corp for responsible disclosure.

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How to protect your site from CVE-2025-13526

If your WordPress site uses OneClick Chat to Order:

1. Patch immediately
   • Update to v1.0.9 or later from the official plugin repository.
   • Confirm that the version number updated correctly and that no old copies exist in staging or backup directories.
2. Review your logs
   • Look for repeated requests to thank-you or order URLs with varying order_id values.
   • Pay attention to unauthenticated requests coming from single IPs with sequential IDs.
3. Scan your site
   • Use our Free Website Vulnerability Scanner at https://free.pentesttesting.com/ to run a quick surface assessment against your WordPress store and other web assets.
   • The scan is agentless and provides a report you can attach to internal risk registers or client security questionnaires.
4. Harden your environment
   • Enforce least privilege for WordPress accounts and hosting control panels.
   • Enable automatic updates where possible, especially for security-sensitive plugins.
   • Layer in a WAF that can help detect abnormal patterns like ID sequencing or mass scraping.

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Lessons for developers: 7 ways to avoid the next WordPress IDOR

1. Treat IDs as secrets, not cosmetics

Any endpoint that takes order_id, user_id, or similar must verify ownership:

function load_order_for_current_user($order_id) {
    $order = get_order_by_id($order_id);
    if (!$order) {
        throw new NotFoundException();
    }

    $current_user_id = get_current_user_id();

    if ($order->user_id !== $current_user_id && !current_user_can('manage_woocommerce')) {
        throw new ForbiddenException();
    }

    return $order;
}

2. Never rely on client-side checks

Client-side hiding of links or “clever” JS routing is not authorization. Attackers will craft requests manually or via scripts.

3. Build negative tests for cross-account access

Don’t just test that “User can view their order.” Also assert that:

• User A cannot view User B’s order.
• Anonymous visitors cannot view any order.

4. Centralize authorization

Abstract object-level checks into shared helpers or middleware so every path—REST API, AJAX handlers, shortcodes, templates—uses the same enforcement.

5. Log anomalies around ID access

Monitor for:

• Many different order_id values from one IP.
• Repeated 403/404 results against order endpoints.
• Access attempts without proper cookies or tokens.

6. Use external validation as a safety net

Combine manual code review with periodic external pentests:

• We’ve documented this approach for APIs in “API Vulnerabilities in Laravel: Identify & Secure Your Endpoints”, where we show how insecure access and missing checks manifest in real code.

Even if your stack is different, the patterns—IDOR, BOLA, missing auth—are the same.

7. Learn from other vulnerability classes

Our other recent deep dives show how to handle high-impact bugs beyond WordPress IDOR vulnerabilities:

• NIS2 Compliance 2025: What’s Actually In Force – how regulators think about incident reporting and risk management for operators of essential services.
• PCI DSS 4.0 Remediation 2025: 21 Battle-Tested Fixes – practical fixes for card data environments that mirror many of the access-control themes in CVE-2025-13526.
• CRLF Injection in Laravel: Exploit and Prevention Guide – another case where small parameter mistakes become large data-exposure paths and how to prevent them.

Together, these posts reinforce the idea that authorization, validation, and logging are patterns—not one-off fixes.

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Related recent blog posts from Pentest Testing Corp

If you’re dealing with CVE-style findings, you’ll likely find these recent articles useful:

• “NIS2 Compliance 2025: What’s Actually In Force” – a practical walkthrough of NIS2 obligations, national implementations, and what security controls regulators actually expect to see in 2025.
• “EU CRA: 12-Month Dev Roadmap for SBOM & Vulnerabilities” – a developer-first plan for SBOMs in CI and vulnerability reporting that dovetails with how you track CVE-2025-13526 and similar bugs.
• “API Vulnerabilities in Laravel: Identify & Secure Your Endpoints” – code-level examples of broken access control, injection, and insecure configuration in API contexts, plus how to scan with our free tool.
• “CRLF Injection in Laravel: Exploit and Prevention Guide” – shows how we pair free scanning at free.pentesttesting.com with manual testing to catch subtle issues.
• “PCI DSS 4.0 Remediation 2025: 21 Battle-Tested Fixes” – if your shop handles card payments, this helps you convert PCI findings into prioritized, developer-friendly work.

Once our main site maintenance windows are over, these pieces will also be surfaced and indexed under the Pentest Testing Corp blog at https://www.pentesttesting.com/blog/.

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How Pentest Testing Corp can help

If you’re reading about CVE-2025-13526 because you’re worried similar issues might be hiding in your stack, here’s how we usually help:

1. Targeted WordPress & plugin penetration testing
   • Manual testing aligned to OWASP ASVS and WordPress-specific attack paths.
   • Focus on checkout flows, order history, customer portals, and admin controls.
2. Risk Assessment Services
   • Map vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-13526 into a unified risk register covering SOC 2, ISO 27001, NIS2, and PCI DSS 4.0 controls.
   • Prioritise fixes based on business impact and regulatory exposure.
   • More at https://www.pentesttesting.com/risk-assessment-services/ (once maintenance is complete).
3. Remediation Services
   • Convert findings into sprintable work items, help implement access-control patterns, and design tests and logging that keep IDOR/BOLA issues from coming back.
   • See https://www.pentesttesting.com/remediation-services/.
4. Free Website Vulnerability Scanner
   • Start with a quick, agentless surface scan https://free.pentesttesting.com/ to spot obvious regression or copy-paste issues before you schedule deep manual testing.

Free Website Vulnerability Scanner Landing Page

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